



A New Fisheries Policy

From principle to practise

Mogens Schou msc@fvm.dk
www.fvm.dk/ylidoffish

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What is fisheries policy about

- A struggle of forces?
- Exploiting a common interest?



What is the goal

Fisheries Policy should aim
at the highest long term economic yield of fish stocks
at the lowest impact cost on stocks and environment

That is an easy task - and a difficult one

We should leave the easy part to government
- Defining the level of outtake

And the difficult part to the fishermen
- To fish it with optimal economy and sustainability



Thesis 1

Market economies and sustainability

Sustainability cannot be achieved unless fishermen can adapt their fishing rights to their changing needs

- They must be able to pool, swap or trade allocations between vessels



Is ownership and transferability of fishing rights
enough to ensure sustainability?

- What about upgrades, misreporting etc.



Thesis 2

Sustainability through accountability

Sustainability cannot be achieved unless the fisherman has the incentive to take responsibility for his total catch.

- He must account for all his catches
- and he must be given the returns of his selective fishing

Danish management



Fishermen obtained transferable fishing rights

- ITQ in the pelagic fishery in 2003
- Vessel quota shares in the demersal fishery in 2007

Flexible transfer mechanisms

- The fisherman can increase his allocation with a phone call.

Rights are limited

- Withdrawal with 8 years notice
- Rules of concentration
- Some of the fish is reserved for "the Fishfund" for new entry

Effects on economy




Danish overcapacity of 30% in the demersal fleet disappeared in less than 2 years.

Fishermen are earning money.

- Potential improved gross earning of 100 mio \$ p.a.

Fishermen think in economic terms

- improve value – not quantity
- Invest in your business
- new generation into the fishery



Theme paper on effects of New Management

Fishermen become younger and earnings increase

New Regulation has induced trading of rights

Biggest investment activity ever

Fishermen choose private financing instead of the Fisheries Bank

Brothers have ordered a new construction at 6 million Euro

New Regulation gives better ships

Fishermen have an increased interest in investments

Vessels are being modernised

Incentives to invest have returned

The bank believes in the fishery

Effects on sustainability



- Over capacity - the overwhelming EU concern for 2 decades will vanish as dew for the sun
- Exchange of rights eliminates "forced" discard

BBC News website 19 september 2008

Ownership key to saving fisheries

By Andrew Ross

Giving fishermen long-term rights to catch fish is key to keeping stocks healthy, scientists conclude.

A global survey found that fisheries managed using individual transferable quotas (ITQs) were half as likely to collapse as others. Long-term quotas give fishermen a stake in conserving fish stocks. The study was published in the journal *Science* just a day after the European Commission announced a major review of EU fisheries policy.

“I have come across situations where fishermen lobby managers to decrease the catch”

Professor Christopher Costello

Can Catch Shares Prevent Fisheries Collapse?

Christopher Costello, 1; Steven D. Gaines, 2 John Lybbaa, 3

A rising tide

Sep 18th 2008
The Economist

Scientists find proof that privatising fishing stocks can avert a disaster



FOR three years, from an office overlooking the Atlantic in Nova Scotia, Boris Worm, a marine scientist, studied what could prevent a fishery from collapsing. By 2006 Dr Worm and his team had worked out that although biodiversity might slow down an erosion of fish stocks, it could not prevent it. Their gloomy prediction was that by 2048 all the world's commercial fisheries would have collapsed.

Now two economists and a marine biologist have looked at an idea that might prevent such a catastrophe. This is the privatisation of commercial fisheries through what are known as catch shares or Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs).



Conclusion on "transferability"

Right based management gives optimal economic yield of the landed fish.

It is a way for national management to ensure

- Fleet adaptation
- No forced discards
- Improved economy

But

- It does not encourage selective fishing, and
- It is not a panacea against upgrading

"No discards from Danish fishermen"

Fiskaren (Norway 18. august 2008)

Is now a possibility!

Is it a reality?



The fisherman's responsibility for the sustainable use of the resource depends on the effect on his economy.

- If his economy depends on how much he can land he will upgrade
- If his economy depends on how he uses his total catch he will fish selectively.

Make him accountable for what he catches, and let him take the responsibility of conducting and documenting his fishery



Paving the way for a New Common Fisheries Policy

Give fishermen the choice of full accountability:

Create an optional "second management track", where fishermen are given increased quotas and less control on the condition that they establish a reliable monitoring (observer, camera etc)

- Danish experiment with camera documentation www.fvm.dk/yieldoffish



The Nordic perspective

The discrepancy between catches and landings is an existential problem for any fishing nation

To ask the user of our common resource to document his activity is a universal, fair and understandable request

And the prerequisites are there

- Monitoring systems
- Methods to find and select the "right" fish
- Management that let the fisherman decide the size of his vessel quota



The global perspective

The world's fishing fleets are losing billions of dollars each year through depleted stocks and poor management, according to a UN report. The World Bank and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) calculate the losses at 50 billion US dollars per year.

Half the world's fishing fleet could be scrapped with no change in catch.

The 4 phases of a responsible fisheries policy



1. Make sure, that fishermen can adapt (transferability)
2. Give the fisherman accountability for his total catch
(Danish experiment with camera documentation www.fvm.dk/yieldoffish)
3. Develop the concept of accountability (juvenile fish "weigh" more)
4. Develop the horizontal framework
 - Precision in advice and fixing of TAC/quotas
 - Incorporating ecosystem consideration in a way that benefits nature, reproduction and the fishers

Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Denmark

Mogens Schou

Ministers advisor on fisheries and aquaculture
><(((("> www.fvm.dk ; msc@fvm.dk
+45 22 61 05 75

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Reform of national fisheries policy
Reform of national aquaculture policy
ICES Council 1996 – 2005
Nordic cooperation
Revisions in 1992 and 2002
Common Fisheries Policy 1983



www.fvm.dk/yieldoffish

Annex. Danish Experiment



The aim of the experiment is to,

- obtain total catch registration of all quota restricted stocks for each participating vessels
- develop a model for obtaining precise biological data in order to advice
- obtain better economic performance of the vessels
- develop a documentation that meets market demands

The experiment,

- 6 vessels conduct a normal fishery with the following supplementary conditions:
- They must perform a total registration of all catches of quota restricted stocks in the experimental area.
 - To ensure this, a monitoring system including GPS, cameras, winch or hydraulic sensor must be in place:

The incentive,

- Vessel participating in the experiment is given an increase in their vessel quota that reflects that all catches are accounted for.
- An edge on the market for sustainable fisheries and a possible certification

HM 555 Kingfisher



ND 399 Meonia



HM 423 Fru Middelboe



S 84 Frk. Nielsen



S 530 Yokotani



79 Tiki



Vessels with
Fisheries Electronic
Observation System